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Dunning (2002) suggested that multinational corporations (MNCs) motives have recently 
shifted from market and resource seeking to efficiency seeking which implies that the 
institutional determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) such as governance and 
economic freedom (EF) have become more important (Loree and Guisinger 1995; 
Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef 2001; Addison and Heshmati 2003, Becchetti and Hasan 
2004). There is, therefore, a considerable interest and a growing literature on the institutional 
determinants of FDI. 
 
There is no universal consensus, however, over the importance and impact of institutional 
determinants of FDI. While the majority of the literature argues for a positive link between 
good governance and FDI inflows, the recent empirical work by Bellos and Subasat (2011) 
indicates that in selected transition countries, the impact of corruption on FDI is positive. In 
other words, corruption does not discourage FDI, as it is often assumed, but encourages it. 
Bellos and Subasat (2012) also investigate the impact of good governance on FDI and found 
similar results. Apart from “democratic accountability”, all the other three governance 
variables (bureaucratic quality, law and order and control of corruption) are negatively 
associated with FDI which implies that poor governance is not an impediment, in fact a 
source of attraction, for MNCs in the selected transition countries. These interesting results 
justify the investigation of EF as the other major institutional determinant of FDI. While 
Subasat and Bellos (Manuscript submitted for publication) investigated the link between EF 
and FDI in selected transition countries, this paper investigates the same link in Latin 
America.      
 
Although there is substantial empirical literature on the link between governance and FDI 
(Gani 2007, Globerman and Shapiro 2002, Globerman and Shapiro 2003; Globerman, 
Shapiro and Tang 2004, Jensen 2003, Li 2005, Li and Filer 2004), and between EF and 
economic growth (Adkins, Moomaw and Savvides 2002, Weede and Kämpf 2002, De Haan 
and Sturm 2000), the literature on the link between EF and FDI is very limited and 
undeveloped. By focussing on the Latin American countries, this article advances this limited 
literature in two major ways. First, unlike most of the existing literature that used a single 
measure, this article uses 45 measures of EF which is more informative. Second, this article 
employs EF measures in target and source countries in order to take both push and pull 
factors into account. For example, the low level of taxes in target countries may be a source 
of attraction for the MNCs but high level of taxes in the source countries may be a source of 
repulsion. 
 
2. THEORY AND LITERATURE 
 
The conventional economic theory suggests that commitment to EF should facilitate more 
FDI inflows into target countries as it reduces inefficiencies, deadweight losses and 
uncertainties (Voyer and Beamish, 2004). The lack of EF can be symptomatic of the various 
ways in which a government may take away potential profits and can be an obstacle to FDI 
(Conklin, 2002). Restrictive trade policies, for example, may discourage MNCs by limiting 
their ability to import necessary inputs and increasing their transaction costs, thus lowering 




productive efficiency (Harms and Ursprung 2002, Drabek and Payne 2001, Habib and 
Zurawicki 2002). Restrictions on repatriation of profits likely to repel MNCs. Extensive bank 
regulations can create disincentives for foreign financial firms (Beck, Levin and Loayza, 
2000). State owned banks can result in poor services, high costs, and weak financing of new 
investments and trade (World Bank, 2003). Similarly, some EF variables in source countries 
such as “Financial freedom”, “Trade freedom” and “Business freedom” which involve 
freedom to operate internationally are likely to facilitate more FDI outflows.  
 
Because EF is a broad concept which involves various forms, its impact on FDI is difficult to 
generalise. While restrictive trade policies in target countries, for example, may discourage 
MNCs by increasing their transaction costs, tariff jumping FDI implies that trade protection 
can also increase inward FDI. Some EF variables such as low tax levels and the absence of 
minimum wage in source countries may increase the attractiveness of domestic markets and 
reduce FDI outflows. Therefore, the impact of various forms of EF on FDI should be 
considered separately.  
 
In this limited literature, most studies fail to distinguish EF from good governance. These 
concepts are often confused and used synonymously. The literature that investigates the 
empirical link between the EF and FDI tend to start with a discussion that focuses on the 
theoretical link between governance and FDI, and the literature they cite often concentrate on 
corruption, transparency and the protection of property rights.
1 While some interventionist 
economic policies (such as import controls) may lead to poor-governance (such as 
corruption), good-governance and EF are clearly distinct concepts. EF refers to the absence 
of state intervention in economic issues whereas governance refers to “the traditions and 
institutions by which the authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton, 1999) and implies “an independent judiciary and legislation, fair and transparent 
laws with impartial enforcement, reliable public financial information, and high public trust” 
(Li, 2005). Obviously a well governed country may implement interventionist economic 
policies and an economically liberal country may poorly be governed. The separation of 
good-governance and EF is important because while the literature that focuses on good-
governance (particularly corruption) is relatively large, there is a very limited literature on the 
link between EF and FDI. 
 
Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) used a single aggregated index of EF (provided by the 
Fraser Institute) in a panel data analysis and found a positive correlation between EF and FDI 
in 18 Latin American countries for 1970-1999. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) focused on the 
U.S. FDI for the time period 1994–1997 and by using a single EF index which was obtained 
from the Heritage Foundation argued that EF would attract U.S FDI. Kobeissi (2005) used a 
single aggregated EF variable which was obtained from the Heritage Foundation and tested 
the relationship between EF and FDI (as well as Governance and Legal System) in the case of 
12 Middle East and North Africa countries between 1990 and 2001. The EF variable was 
modestly significant at 10 percent level in four out of six estimations. Ferragina and Pastore 
(2006) used a panel gravity model to investigate the FDI diversion effect of the integration 
process to the EU in the case of Central and Eastern Europe and South Mediterranean 
countries for the period 1994-2004. Alongside the traditional gravity model variables, an 
                                                            
1 For example Kapuria-Foreman (2007) suggests that “[e]conomists believe that freely functioning markets 
facilitate economic growth. Corruption, by increasing transactions costs, can increase friction in an economy 
and slow its growth.” See also Caetano and Caleiro (2009) for similar arguments that confuse EF with good 
governance. 




aggregated governance variable and economic variables such as openness to trade
2 and 
volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate, they included two EF variables, current and 
capital account restrictions, which were negative and statistically significant. By focussing on 
developing countries and excluding the transition countries, Kapuria-Foreman (2007) used 
five broad measures of EF in a cross country study. The results suggested that while 
government interventions in the economy, barriers to capital flows and foreign investment, 
and the lack of protection of private property rights had negative impact on FDI, trade 
protectionism and the level of regulation had no statistically significant impact. Heriot, Theis 
and Campbell (2008) used the 5 major categories of the Fraser Institute measure of EF in a 
sample of 121 countries for the period of 2000 and 2005, and argued that apart from 
government size all the other categories are positively linked with FDI. This paper, however, 
includes no control variables and likely to suffer from excluded variables bias. By using the 
fuzzy logic clustering methodology, Caetano and Caleiro (2009), focused on the MENA 
countries and by employing the aggregated EF data provided by the Heritage Foundation 
argued that economic freedom and inward FDI are positively associated. While all the above 
studies found a positive correlation between economic freedom and FDI, they relied on a 
very limited number of EF measures which fails to capture the diverse nature of EF.    
 
3. MODEL  
Gravity models are often used to study trade flows between source and host economies but 
they are also successfully used to study FDI flows. The main components of the model are 
the market sizes of the source and target economies and the distance between their main 
economic centres. Given these variables, the potential FDI between two countries can be 
estimated and other variables can be added into the model to estimate their relative impact on 
FDI. In our analyses we use a number of control variables that are considered to be important 
in the relevant literature and add the EF measures to access their impacts. Panel data models 
provide a series of well known advantages. The larger sample size in relation to both cross-
sectional and time-series analyses improves the accuracy of regression estimates. It can 
reduce the impact of omitted variable bias. It can also address heterogeneity problems that 
often complicate cross-sectional analyses as not all country-specific factors can be included 
in the regression estimates.   
The model takes the following form: 
FDIS,Ty = β0 + β1  GDPSy  +  β2 GDPTy + β3 DISTANCES,T + β4 EFTy + β5 EFSy + β6 
CONTROLT,Sy  
Where 
S is source, T is target and y is time.  
FDISTy is the bilateral FDI stock from the source to target country in current US Dollars 
(UNCTAD). Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007) suggest that working with FDI stock 
rather than flows has certain advantages. For example, stocks are more stable than flows and 
measure capital ownership better as it involves FDI that is financed in local capital markets. 
                                                            
2 Openness to trade is considered as a close approximate to free trade regime but Subasat (2008) argued that this 
may not be the case.  




GDPSy and GDPTy are the GDPs of the source and target countries in current US Dollars 
(World Development Indicators). A number of alternative stipulations of the model were 
considered. For example, GDPs were replaced by per capita GDPs and populations but such 
specifications were problematical as per capita GDPs were highly correlated with some of the 
EF variables. We have also considered the quadratic forms of both GDPs and distance to 
account for possible non-linearity but this specification did not improve our results. While we 
do not report these estimations in this paper, we confirm that they produced very consistent 
results in terms of the EF variables. 
 
DISTANCEST is the geographic distance between the source and target country which is a 
proxy for transportation and information costs (Centre d’ Etudes Prospectives et d’ 
Informations Internationales). However, as trade cost also increases with distance, MNCs 
may prefer to invest rather than trade. Therefore the sign on the distance variable can be 
ambiguous (Guerin 2006).  
EFTy and EFSy are the 45 economic freedom variables in the target and source countries which 
are taken from two sources. The Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFoWI) produced 
by the Fraser Institute provides very detailed 58 EF variables which are aggregated under five 
sub-headings: Size of Government, Legal System & Property Rights, Sound Money, 
Freedom to Trade Internationally, Regulation. We exclude “Legal System & Property 
Rights” and “Sound Money” variables from our analysis as they measure governance and 
macroeconomic policy. The “Index of Economic Freedom” (IoEF) is produced by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, and provides 8 measures of EF (Business 
Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, 
Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Labor Freedom) and 2 measures of governance 
(Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption). The governance variables and “Labor 
Freedom” are excluded due to data limitation.  
The EFoWI ranks countries between 0 and 10 and IoEF ranks countries between 0 and 100 
where larger values represent the greatest EF. If high EF in target countries encourages FDI, 
a positive sign on the coefficients would be expected. Note that all the EF variables are based 
on subjective rankings which can be highly problematical. This is a well recognized concern 
for the empirical literature that uses such measures.
3 Missing values in data which can 
significantly influence our results is another concern. The results, therefore, should be read 
with care. 
 
CONTROLTy refers to the control variables that are added to reduce the risk of excluded 
variables bias. These variables were selected from a larger list of relevant variables that have 
been considered important in previous work. Many variables in the original list were 
excluded from the final estimations as they were either highly correlated with the EF 
variables or statistically insignificant. Some variables were also excluded due to gaps in data 
and concerns over the degree of freedom. Gaps in data imply significantly reduced degree of 
freedom which required striking the right balance between the need to maximize the number 
of control variables and concerns over lower degree of freedom. Since missing values was a 
real concern for the core variables (such as bilateral FDI and EF) and since the use panel data 
reduces the impact of omitted variable bias, our priority was to maximise the degree of 
                                                            
3 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) for a discussion of the problems inherent in making cross-
country comparisons.  




freedom rather than maximizing the number of control variables. Nevertheless we still have a 
large number of control variables:    
“Oil” is the volume of oil production in thousands barrels per day (US Energy Information 
Administration). “Same-religion” is a measure of cultural similarity. The “Colonial-link” 
aims to capture historical ties (CEPII). The “Land-lock” is used as a proxy for high 
transportation costs. “Colonial-link” and “Land-lock” are dummy variables which take either 
the value one or zero. “GDP growth” is lagged growth of GDP as a measure of economic 
performance (World Development Indicators). The lags help avoiding potential endogeneity 
problems. “Inflation” is a measure of macroeconomic instability (World Development 
Indicators). “Ethnic Tensions” is an assessment of the degree of tension within a country 
attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. “Investment Profile” is an assessment 
of factors affecting the risk to investment that has 3 subcomponents: Contract 
viability/Expropriation, profits repatriation, external conflict. “Religion in  Politics” is a 
measure of religious tensions. “Ethnic Tensions” and “Religion in Politics” (6) are scaled 
from 0 to 6, and “Investment Profile” is scaled from 0 to 12. These variables are taken from 
the PRS Group International Country Risk Guide and high values indicate lesser problems. 
All variables are in logarithmic form. As a considerable portion of observations for some 
measures are zeros, working on the logarithm of FDI then imposes to drop these 
observations, with a potential selection bias. In order to circumvent this problem a small 
constant has been added to zero values.  
 
4. PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
The data cover a period of 24 years (1985-2008). The country sample includes 24 target 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela) and 31 source 
countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US). 
 
The large number of EF variables that are included in the baseline model can overcrowd the 
results table. Therefore we first estimate the baseline model to show its accuracy (Table 1) 
and then present the coefficients and t-ratios of each EF variables in Table 2. As EF variables 
are likely to be correlated with each other, they are not included in the same regression. In 
order to avoid multicollinearity problem, we estimate separate regressions for each EF 
variable. While we do not report the full regression details in table 2 to avoid overcrowding 
of the table, we report the coefficients and t-ratios of 45 separate estimations. A similar 
multicollinearity problem may exist for the variables in the baseline model in table 1 which 
may distort their coefficients but this is not a matter of concern as multicollinearity between 
the control variables would have no impact on the coefficients of EF variables. When the 
control variables were found to be collinear with the EF variables, however, they were 
excluded from the estimations in order to avoid multicollinearity problem.  




The baseline model results in Table 1 validate our dataset as the core variables of the gravity 
model work well. Distance, GDP and all the other control variables are highly significant and 
have the expected signs. 
The empirical model is estimated by using the Random Effects method which requires the 
application of the Generalized Least Square method to achieve efficient results. Potential 
Heteroskedasticity problems were resolved by using the Newey-West Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. The stationarity of the variables were tested by 
adopting the Levin, Lee and Chu and the Philips Perron methods with a Newey West 
bandwidth selection. For the stationarity tests, the appropriate number of lags was selected by 
using the Schwarz Information Criterion. We confirm that most variables pass both tests and 
the remaining few pass one of the tests.  
 
5. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
While we do not have enough space to discuss the full implications of our results, a number 
of conclusions emerge. For the target countries, two main categories of the EFoWI (Size of 
Government and Freedom to Trade Internationally) have positive and significant coefficients 
whereas the remaining main category (Regulation) has a negative but insignificant 
coefficient. Out of 35 sub-categories only 12 have positive and significant, 8 have negative 
and significant and 15 have insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, while “Size of 
government” has a positive and significant coefficient, one of its major sub-categories, 
namely “General government consumption as share of total consumption” has a negative and 
significant coefficient which implies that government consumption encourages FDI. While 
some of them are insignificant, most sub-categories of the “Freedom to trade internationally” 
have positive and consistent coefficients. Noticeably, “Tariffs” has a very significant 
coefficient. In other words freedom to trade appears to be an important determinant of FDI. 
The same cannot be said for “Regulation”. While “Credit market regulation” and its sub-
components all have positive and highly significant coefficients, “Labor market regulations” 
and “Business regulations” have negative coefficients and the latter has a significant 
coefficient. This implies that while MNCs are not discouraged by “Labor market 
regulations”, they are encouraged by “Business regulations”. It is interesting to note that apart 
from “Price controls” which appears as a deterrent to FDI, other components of “Business 
regulations” such as “Administrative conditions/entry of new business”, “Time with 
government bureaucracy”, “Licensing restrictions” and “Tax compliance” appear to 
encourage FDI. 
 
For the source countries “Freedom to trade internationally” and “Regulation” have no 
meaningful impact on outward FDI and “Size of government” has a positive and significant 
impact which implies that a decline in the size of government encourages outward FDI. 
However, some of the sub-components of “Freedom to trade internationally” (notably 
“Tariffs” and “Hidden import barriers”) and most of the sub-components of “Regulation” 
have positive and highly significant coefficients. Interestingly, all the sub-components of 
“Labor market regulations” have positive and significant coefficients which imply that the 
deregulation of the labour markets encourages FDI outflows.   
 
For the target countries, 1 out of 7 IoEF indicators (Trade freedom) has positive and 
significant, 2 (Government spending and fiscal freedom) have negative and significant and 4 




have insignificant coefficients. This implies that only the lack of “Trade freedom” is major 
concern for MNCs whereas “Government spending” and the lack of “Fiscal freedom” are in 
fact a source of attraction. The lack of “Investment freedom”, “Monetary freedom”, 
“Business freedom” and “Financial freedom” has no significant effect on FDI.  
 
For the source countries, “Government spending”, “Business freedom” and “Financial 
freedom” encourages outward FDI and “Monetary freedom” discourages it. “Investment-
freedom”, “Trade freedom” and “Fiscal freedom” have no significant effect on FDI.    
 
The above results suggest that while EF is an important determinant of FDI, its impact cannot 
be generalised. This conclusion is in line with the findings of Subasat and Bellos (Manuscript 
submitted for publication) who investigated the link between EF and FDI in selected 
transition countries. The impact of free trade (both in source and target countries) is 
consistently positive and supported by the results of both databases. This implies that 
countries wish to attract more FDI need to have liberal trade regimes. However apart from 
trade freedom our results provide a limited support for the conventional wisdom and 
produced a number of surprising results. Government spending, for example, seems to be a 
source of attraction for MNCs rather than being a deterrent. While, the lack of “Labour 
market regulations” in the target countries does not discourage FDI, labour market 
deregulations in the source countries strongly encourage FDI outflows. This is rather 
surprising as we would expect “Labor market regulations” in source countries to be a source 
of repulsion which implies that the deregulation of the labor markets would increase the 
attractiveness of domestic markets and likely to reduce FDI outflows. Apart from “Price 
controls”, business regulations in target countries are a source of attraction for MNCs and 
business de-regulations in the source countries encourages FDI outflows. We conclude 
therefore that while EF is an important FDI determinant in the selected Latin American 
countries, its impact cannot be generalised and our results do not provide a strong evidence 
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Table 1: Baseline Panel Data Gravity Model Estimates 
Constant -21.94* 
(-10.1) 
Land locked (T)  0.36 
(1.68) 
Ethnic tensions (T)  -0.07* 
(-7.87) 
GDP (S)  0.46* 
(13.9) 
Land locked (S)  0.42* 
(2.72) 
Ethnic tensions (S)  -0.37* 
(-5.07) 
GDP (T)  0.70* 
(15.1) 
GDP growth (T)  -0.07* 
(-2.59) 




GDP growth (S)  0.18 
(1.79) 




Inflation (T)  -0.11* 
(-9.90) 
Religion in Politics (T)  0.22 
(1.78) 
Same religion  0.95* 
(3.75) 
Inflation (S)  -0.04 
(-0.93) 




      
          
N 2362  Wald-Joint  1976.0  AR(1)  38.93 
R^2 0.572  Wald-dummy  101.1  AR(2)  24.67 
Notes: The independent variable is bilateral FDI stock between source and target countries. “*” is significant at 
1 % level and “
**” is significant at 10 % level. All the variables are in logarithmic form. 
 
 




Table 2: Panel Data Gravity Model Estimates for EF variables 








EFoWI Variables      
1. Size of Government 0.35  2.13*  0.24  2.10* 
   1A. General government consumption as share of total consumption  -0.24  -2.15*  0.08  1.05 
   1B. Transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP  -0.20  -1.29  0.06  0.91 
   1C. Government enterprises and investment as a share of gross investment 0.01  1.87*  0.152  5.47* 
   1D. Top marginal tax rate  0.03  1.47  0.01  0.72 
        1Di. Top Marginal Income Tax Rate  0.05  2.26*  0.02  1.08 
        1Dii. Top Marginal Income and Payroll Tax Rate  0.11  2.30*  0.175  3.23* 
4. Freedom to Trade Internationally 0.33  4.01*  0.42  1.44 
   4A. Tariffs  0.45  5.01*  0.36  2.65* 
        4Ai. International trade tax revenues (% of trade sector)  0.32 2.94* 2.67 4.40* 
        4Aii. Mean tariff rate  0.02  1.31  0.33  1.02 
   4B. Regulatory Trade Barriers  0.09  0.86  0.08  0.35 
        4Bi. Hidden import barriers  0.22  2.43*  0.04  5.09* 
        4Bii. Costs of importing  0.08  1.05  -0.02  -1.99* 
   4C. Actual vs. expected size of trade sector  -0.01  -0.74  0.00  0.01 
   4E. International Capital Market  Controls  0.01 1.23 0.16 1.71 
        4Ei. Access of Citizens to foreign capital markets &  
        foreign access to domestic capital markets 
-0.03 -0.36 0.06  0.38 
        4Eii. Restrictions in Foreign Capital Market Exchange &  
        Index of capital controls among 13 IMF categories 
0.00 0.61 0.05 3.4* 
5. Regulation -0.05  -0.54  0.07  0.31 
   5A. Credit Market Regulation  0.07  2.16*  0.21  1.14 
        5Ai. Ownership of banks  0.10  6.54*  0.00  0.25 
        5Aii. Competition in domestic banking  0.30  3.62*  0.06  8.26* 
        5Aiii. Extension of credit  0.33  4.89* -0.25 -2.64* 
        5Aiv. Interest rate controls  0.03  4.22*  0.24  0.62 
   5B. Labor Market Regulations  -0.15  -1.36  0.42  3.80* 
        5Bi. Impact of minimum wage  -0.01  -0.91  0.05  5.91* 
        5Bii. Hiring and firing practices  -0.07  -1.15  0.04  4.83* 
        5Biii. Labor force share with wages set by centralized collective bargaining -0.22 -2.02* 0.14  3.68* 
        5Biv. Unemployment insurance (Mandated hiring costs)  -0.26  -2.54*  0.13  3.65* 
        5Bv. Mandated dismissal costs  0.01  1.93*  0.01  4.10* 
        5Bvi. Use of conscripts  0.00  0.19  0.16  6.48* 
   5C. Business Regulations  -0.39  -3.50*  0.15  0.93 
        5Ci. Price controls  0.02  3.37*  0.02  2.03* 
        5Cii. Administrative Conditions/Entry of New Business  -0.10  -2.29*  0.19  3.11* 
        5Ciii. Time with government  bureaucracy  -0.17 -3.12* -0.01  -1.06 
        5Civ. Starting a new business  -0.02  -0.41  0.08  2.31* 
        5Cvi. Licensing restrictions  -0.29  -2.20*  0.01  2.89* 
        5Cvii. Tax compliance  -0.07  -3.07*  0.01  2.93* 
IoEF  Variables      
Government Spending  -0.43  -3.13*  0.01  2.16* 
Investment  Freedom  0.05 0.88 0.03 0.52 
Trade Freedom  0.23  2.26*  0.14  0.62 
Fiscal  Freedom  -0.56 -3.86* -0.00  -0.14 
Monetary Freedom  0.08  0.78  -0.63  -2.04* 
Business Freedom  -0.02  -0.20  0.43  4.24* 
Financial Freedom  -0.01  -0.31  0.16  2.32* 
Notes: The independent variable is bilateral FDI stock between source and target countries. “*” is significant at 
1 % level and “
**” is significant at 10 % level. All the variables are in logarithmic form. 
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